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JAMESON 
A. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted 
Jameson argues in his Brief that Spencer has failed to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted (Jameson Brief P. 14). Jameson asserted said affirmative 
defense in his Answer (R. P. 49). However, Jameson did not assert said affirmative 
defense in his Motion for Summary Judgment (AR. P. 17-27), and the District Court did 
not grant the Motion for Summary Judgment based on said affirmative defense (R. P. 
In Sanchez v. Arave, 120 ldaho 321, 815 P.2d 1061 (1991), this Court held: 
The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that 
are presented for the first time on appeal. E.g., Kinsela v. State, DepY of 
Finance, 117 ldaho 632, 634, 790 P.2d 1388,1390 (1990). Recently we 
applied the rule to dismiss the appeal in a case where the state asked us 
to rule on an issue that was not raised in the trial court. State v. Martin, 
119 ldaho 577, 808 P.2d 1322 (1991). 
The rationale for this rule was first stated by the Supreme Court of the 
Territory of ldaho in 1867: 
It is for the protection of inferior courts. It is manifestly unfair 
for a party to go into court and slumber, as it were, on [a] 
defense, take no exception to the ruling, present no point for 
the attention of the court, and seek to present [the] defense, 
that was never mooted before, to the judgment of the 
appellate court. Such a practice would destroy the purpose 
of an appeal and make the supreme court one for deciding 
questions of law in the first instance. Smith v. Sterling, 1 
ldaho 128, 131 (1867). 
Having failed to argue the affirmative defense of failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted before the District Court, below, it is respectfully requested 
that this Court decline to entertain Jameson's argument at this juncture. 
B. Subordination 
Should the Court consider the affirmative defense of Failure to State a Claim 
Upon Which Relief can be granted, Jameson's Motion for Summary Judgment should 
still be denied. 
Jameson argues that, if a surplus from the Trustee's sale exists, Spencer is not 
entitled to the surplus because of the terms and conditions of the Subordination 
Agreement dated November 14,2002 (AR. P. 138). 
The answer to the question of whether Spencer is entitled to the surplus does 
not end the inquiry. As set forth in Spencer's Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment and Damages, Spencer sought alternative relief. Not only did Spencer seek 
an award of the surplus, but Spencer sought an order from the District Court declaring 
the Trustee's sale invalid and rescheduling the same. 
In granting Jameson's Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court agreed 
with Spencer that there were irregularities in the manner in which the sale occurred. 
However, the District Court then stated that ". . .the Plaintiff has not shown that this 
irregularity in bidding has caused an unfair situation of Plaintiff or in fact caused him 
any harm at all." (R. P. 78). Spencer argued before the District Court that Idaho Code 
§ 45-1507(3) provides that excess sale proceeds shall be distributed to subordinate lien 
holders on the property sold. Spencer argued that he is, and was, obligated, to pay the 
note relative to the subordinated lien, and Spencer, therefore, had a direct interest in 
the sale of DOT No. 1 and DOT No. 2 being conducted in a manner consistent with the 
statutory requirements, free of "irregularities" and for market value. 
The District Court's finding that the foreclosure sale of DOT No. 1 and DOT No 
2 was conducted irregularly, but then concluding said irregularities caused Spencer no 
harm, ignores the fact that the surplus from the Defendant's bid should have been paid 
to Thompson, wh~ch would have reduced the Plaintiff's liability to Thompson. 
As a result, Spencer has asserted a claim upon which relief can be granted 
C. Equity 
Jameson has also asserted in his Brief that it would be inequitable for the Court 
to adopt Spencer's argument (Jameson Brief P. 14). The concept of equity is quite 
broad and encompasses various theories. Jameson has failed to identify the equitable 
theory under which his argument is made, and Jameson has failed to cite any legal 
authority for this argument 
In Huff v. Singleton 143 ldaho 498, 148 P.3d 1244 (2006), this Court stated: 
When issues presented on appeal are not supported by propositions of 
law, citation to legal authority, or argument they will not be considered by 
this Court. Langley v. State, 126 ldaho 781, 784, 890 P.2d 732, 735 
(1995). 
Jameson argues that the manner in which the express contracts, DOT No. 1 and 
DOT No. 2, were entered into were proper. Yet, Jameson argues that if Spencer's 
argument is correct, Jameson will suffer an inequity. An inequity, if it exists, which 
occurred entirely as the result of Jameson's (or Davidson Trust's) own actions in 
deciding upon the order in which the foreclosure sales were conducted, 
In Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham LLC 141 ldaho 185, 108 P.3d 332 
(2005), this Court stated: 
However, equitable remedies may be available even where an express 
contract exists, if the contract is unlawful, unconscionable or violates 
public policy. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 ldaho 222, 227, 999 
P.2d 877, 882 (2000). It has not been asserted that the term at issue is 
unlawful and we have already concluded the term does not violate public 
policy. 
This Court recently addressed the doctrine of unconscionability in Lovey 
v. Regence BlueShield of ldaho, 139 ldaho 37, 72 P.3d 877 (2003): 
Courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts 
in order to make them more equitable. Smith v. ldaho State 
Univ. Federal Credit Union, 114 ldaho 680, 760 P.2d 19 
(1988). Equity may intervene to change the terms of a 
contract if the unconscionable conduct is serious enough to 
justify the court's interference. Id. "While a court of equity will 
not relieve a party from a bargain merely because of 
hardship, yet he [or she] may claim the interposition of the 
court if an unconscionable advantage has been taken of his 
[or her] necessity or weakness." 114 ldaho at 684, 760 P.2d 
at 23 (quoting 28 AM. JUR. 20 Equity § 24 (1966)). It is not 
sufficient, however, that the contractual provisions appear 
unwise or their enforcement may seem harsh. Walker v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 130 ldaho 824,948 P.2d 1123 
(1997). 
For a contract or contractual provision to be voided as 
unconscionable, it must be both procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable. Id. Procedural 
unconscionability relates to the bargaining process leading 
to the agreement while substantive unconscionability 
focuses upon the terms of the agreement itself. Id. 
Jameson has failed to demonstrate to the District Court, and this Court, how 
DOT No. 1 and DOT No. 2 are unlawful, unconscionable or violate public policy. It is 
respectfully requested that the Court decline to consider Jameson's equitable 
argument 
DAVIDSON TRUST 
Davidson Trust argues in its Brief that "The $5,000.00 is Not Missing" (Brief of 
Davidson Trust P. 9). Davidson Trust cites Paragraph V of DOT No. 2 in support of it's 
argument. Paragraph 5 of DOT No. 2 is entitled: "To Protect the security of this Deed 
of Trust, Grantor agrees:" (R. P. 16) Paragraph A has six subsections. Subsection 1 
generally requires the Grantor to keep the property in good condition and repair 
Subsection 2 generally requires the Grantor to maintain fire insurance. Subsection 3 
generally requires the Grantor to appear and defend any actions purporting to affect the 
real property. Subsection 4 generally requires the Grantor to pay taxes, encumbrances 
and liens on the real property. Subsection 5 requires the Grantor to immediately pay all 
sums set forth in Subsections 1-4 which are expended by the Beneficiary or Trustee. 
Subsection 6 generally provides that if the Grantor fails to make payment or do any act 
set forth in Paragraph A, that the Beneficiary or Trustee may do the same to protect the 
security. 
Initially, it should again be pointed out that DOT No. 2 contains absolutely no 
language stating a mobile home is part of the security for the loan. Furthermore, as 
previously stated, the mobile home was personal property, not real property, and was 
therefore not subject to sale via a non-judicial foreclosure. 
There is no disagreement between the Parties that the $5,000.00 was never 
provided to Spencer. Davidson Trust's argument is that the $5,000.00 was spent on 
"improvements" (Brief of Davidson Trust P. 10) to the mobile home. The expenditures 
for the "improvements" were made after DOT No. 2 was foreclosed (Affidavit of Ed 
Jameson AR. P. 145-146). 
Clearly, the $5,000.00 was not spent by the beneficiary or the trustee of DEED 
OF TRUST No. 2 to protect the real property as contemplated by DOT No. 2. The 
mobile home was not real property. Clearly, the $5,000.00 was expended after the 
foreclosure of DOT No. 2, and therefore, could not have been to protect the real 
property because the title to the real property, and the possession of the real property, 
was with the beneficiary. The $5,000.00 was spent by the beneficiary to improve the 
value of the real property. Spencer should not be required to pay the beneficiary for 
improving the real property after the foreclosure had occurred. 
Davidson Trust essentially concludes its argument on this issue by stating DOT 
No. 2 provides Spencer be liable to pay Davidson Trust and Jameson for the 
improvements made to the mobile home after the date of the foreclosure, and in the 
alternative, it is equitable that Spencer be liable to pay Davidson Trust and Jameson for 
the improvements made to the mobile home after the date of the foreclosure. As set 
forth above, DOT No. 2 does not contemplate that Spencer is liable for improvements 
made to personal property after the date of the foreclosure upon which personal 
property stood. In addition, Davidson Trust has failed to cite any legal authority in 
support of its equitable argument, and for the reasons and the legal authority cited 
herein relative to Jameson's arguments that are without legal authority, it is respectfully 
requested that the Court decline to address Davidson Trust's equitable arguments. 
3. 
CONCLUSION 
There are genuine issues of material fact in dispute in the above-entitled matter. 
In the alternative, the facts demonstrate the foreclosure of DOT No. 1 and DOT No. 2 
were conducted improperly, and Spencer is entitled to the relief sought in his Complaint 
herein. In either event, the District Court's granting of Jameson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was in error, and it is therefore respectfully requested that this Court reverse 
the decision of the District Court and remand the matter for further proceedings. 
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